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Abstract: Thompson Clarke’s seminal paper “The Legacy of Skepticism” (1972) is 
notoriously difficult in both substance and presentation. Despite the paper’s 
importance to skepticism studies in the nearly half-century since its publication, 
no attempt has been made in the secondary literature to provide an account, based 
on a close reading of the text, of just what Clarke’s argument is. Furthermore, 
much of the existing literature betrays (or so it seems to me) fundamental 
misunderstandings of Clarke’s thought. In this essay, I attempt to explain—
concisely but comprehensively—Clarke’s overall argument in “The Legacy of 
Skepticism.” 
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If we attempt to examine the mirror in itself, we 
uncover, finally, nothing but the things upon it. If we 
want to seize hold of the things, we come up, in the end, 
with nothing but the mirror. — This is, in the most 
general terms, the history of knowledge. 
Nietzsche, Dawn (§243) 
 
— Am I understood? Have I been understood? ... 
“Absolutely not! Dear Sir!” — Then let us start at the 
beginning. 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (§3.1) 
 
 
1 The Difficulty of Grasping Clarke’s “Legacy” 
 
Thompson Clarke’s seminal paper “The Legacy of Skepticism” (LS) is notoriously 
difficult in both substance and presentation. It covers an extraordinary amount of 
ground in its modest 6,500 words. Twice in the opening paragraph, Clarke 
apologizes for the inadequacy of what follows: LS explores its topic, he warns us, 
“much too briefly,” and he expresses “regret” that he does not have “sufficient space 
to examine certain deservedly renowned doctrines which bear on these questions” 
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(754).1 Similar remarks appear throughout Clarke’s unpublished dissertation, The 
Nature of Traditional Epistemology (NTE). In the final section of the dissertation, 
with fewer than twenty pages to go, he writes that “I regard the preceding pages 
as primarily a prolegomena to the topic we now take up. Unfortunately, what I can 
say is only in the nature of suggestions” (NTE, 231). Presumably, Clarke did not 
think at the time that LS would be his final published work any more than he had 
thought that NTE would be. He lived another forty years and continued pursuing 
the topics raised in LS throughout much, if not all, of that time. Even so, none of 
his later work has (or, apparently, ever will) see the light of day. We can only wish 
that Clarke had written the book or books required to unpack his views on 
skepticism, the nature of philosophy, and the relation between philosophy and 
everyday life. As it is, anyone who wants to understand LS must try to make sense 
of it without the aid of whatever elaborations or clarifications Clarke might 
subsequently have provided. 
In this paper, I attempt to explain, concisely but comprehensively, what Clarke 
is saying in LS. The task is made difficult by the scope and density of the material: 
LS is its own summary; any attempt to explain it must expand upon it. But it is also 
made difficult by the paper’s systematicity. Any attempt to trace just one of LS’s 
numerous argumentative threads inevitably requires explaining the entire article. 
Ultimately, nothing in the paper is dispensable to Clarke’s argument. What is 
dispensable, however—at least insofar as we treat LS as an argument rather than as 
a carefully constructed piece of philosophical literature—is Clarke’s own 
presentation of the material. I’ve found that any attempt to comment on LS section-
by-section, to order the topics as Clarke does, leads either to madness or a 
monograph. Thus, I will go a different way. Indeed, I will follow a trajectory that 
moves, though with many forward and backward leaps, from the end of the paper 
to the beginning. 
 
2 The Problem of the Structure of the Plain 
 
The conclusion to which LS’s interlocking parts are meant to lead is this: We must 
reject the traditional conception of what I will call the ‘human epistemic standpoint’ 
(HES)—what Clarke refers to in one place as “our epistemological position” (761). 
Rejecting the traditional conception of the HES leaves us with the problem of 
replacing it with a new, nontraditional conception. This “philosophical problem of 
the greatest magnitude” (NTE, 242) is nothing less than the problem of developing 
a new conception of what human beings are as knowers of the world and ultimately 
of what the world itself is inasmuch as it is the object of our experience, i.e., 
inasmuch as it is “our world,” a world that may or may not turn out to accord with 
“the ontology of the plain man” (NTE, 99–100). 
That this is Clarke’s conclusion is not obvious from the text. Although he 
clearly thinks that the traditional conception of the HES must be rejected,2 Clarke 
tells us at the end of LS that the legacy of Cartesian skepticism—i.e., the “new, 
challenging problem” with which Cartesian skepticism leaves us—is “the problem 
of the plain, of its structure, the character and source of its relative ‘non-objectivity’” 
(769). It seems, then, that Clarke’s conclusion is that we must develop a new 
conception of the plain, not the HES. At the end of LS, however, he links the 
            
1 All otherwise unattributed citations refer to page numbers in LS. 
2 Near the end of LS, Clarke writes that “our conceptual-human constitution can’t be of the 
standard type” (769). 
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structure of the plain and the structure of the HES, albeit very quickly and without 
emphasizing the point. He writes: “How radically that structure [i.e., the structure 
of the plain] must differ from the standard type... is evident enough” (769). By “the 
standard type,” Clarke is referring to what he calls ‘the standard conceptual-human 
constitution.’3 Why, though, does he equate the structure of the plain with the 
structure of the HES? The short answer is that the (actual) plain is our plain; as 
such, its structure is entwined with the structure of our epistemic relation to the 
world, i.e., with the HES. 
 
2.1 The Plain 
 
To begin making sense of this, we must ask what Clarke means by ‘the plain.’ He 
introduces the idea in the following passage, where he states what I will call ‘the 
immunity thesis’: 
 
... there is a large, important domain of questions, claims, and the like, 
ideal for [G.E.] Moore, where a “proof” like his is a proving, where 
knowing stands in need of no argued defense because the epistemic is 
immune (oversimplifying slightly) from skeptical assault. The domain, of 
course, is the everyday, the particular questions, claims, et al., occurring 
within specific, elaborate, contexts of everyday life, instances par excellence 
of what I shall call “plain” questions, etc. (754–5) 
 
The “domain” of the plain, then, includes the “specific, elaborate, contexts of 
everyday life.” As we’ll see in §3.4, Clarke thinks that the plain is nearly, but not 
quite, coextensive with the everyday.4 It follows that the vast majority of plain 
“questions, claims, et al.”5 are made in “everyday circumstances” (755, 756). These 
“circumstances” or “contexts” provide an extra dimension of meaning to our 
utterances, one that is not reducible to “the meaning of words, alone or in 
combination,” but is rather to be identified “with what we mean, say, or imply, in 
uttering the words (with their meanings)” (755). This extra semantic dimension is 
bound up with “our practices,” with “elemental parts of our human nature” (761). 
These “[c]ontextual features... exercise control, on us and on how the language 
segments within the context are to be understood” (757). Beyond the plain—
outside of all contexts—lies the domain of what Clarke calls ‘the philosophical.’ 
In NTE, Clarke describes the two dimensions of meaning this way. Consider 
a “how much?” question, e.g., “How much of object x can you actually see?” 
Regarding this sort of question, Clarke writes that “the words alone as a part of 
language carry some meaning... We might say that language alone carries the 
skeletal meaning of the finished question.” It is up to the “particular case” (i.e., the 
            
3 Clarke never uses this exact phrase. The idea is first introduced on 760, where he refers to a 
“conceptual-human constitution... of a ‘standard’ type.” The term “standard type” appears 
throughout the rest of LS (761, 762, 765, 768, 769), and it is always, with the exception of its 
final appearance, explicitly tied to the standard conceptual-human constitution. 
4 Given the near-concordance of the plain and the everyday, I will for the most part use the 
terms interchangeably, though it must be borne in mind throughout that, for Clarke, “the 
dimensions of the circle of the plain” (756) do extend beyond the everyday 
5  In what follows, I will shorten “questions, claims, et al.” to ‘utterances,’ with the understanding 
that this category encompasses merely potential utterances, such as thoughts or inscriptions, 
as well as actual utterances. 
Roger E. Eichorn 
73 
Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, vol. XII, n. 23, 2021, pp. 70–102 - ISSN 1981-4534 
context of the utterance) to “put flesh on the skeletal meaning.” Isolated from any 
context (i.e., when intended philosophically) “[t]he utterance is meaningful in the 
sense that it has skeletal meaning. The utterance is not meaningful in the sense that 
it does not ask a full-bodied question” (NTE, 199–200). When we examine context-
bound utterances, Clarke finds, “we become aware that these cases contain a 
dimension [of meaning] not to be identified with the language uttered in these 
cases” (NTE, 172),6 i.e., with “English as a system of rules” (NTE, 179). He refers 
to this as the “non-rule-like dimension” of meaning (NTE, 173), also as “the extra-
linguistic dimension” (NTE, 181).7 
For the most part, plain utterances are embedded in the everyday world. “[A]s 
plain men,” Clarke writes, “we are ‘inside the world’” (762). Plain utterances “seem 
to be placed within the world as an unquestionable context” (NTE, 179). The 
unquestionability of the world as such or as a whole underwrites the immunity of 
plain knowing to philosophical (specifically Cartesian) skepticism, understood as 
the denial of our knowledge of the existence of the external (mind-independent) 
world. Clarke agrees with commonsense philosophers that, in everyday life, our 
empirical knowledge-claims can be justified with reference to the following 
unquestionable postulates: “We can know that there are physical objects in the 
world. We can see (and touch) physical objects. We can know that there are physical 
objects because we can see (and touch) them” (NTE, 5–6; cf. NTE 68, 95, 235). 
Clarke identifies these as the “most important”—or “most fundamental” (NTE, 
235)—“so-called common sense beliefs about empirical knowledge” (NTE, 5), and 
they are in some sense the bedrock of our everyday epistemic practices, at least 
regarding empirical matters. This is why Clarke suggests that a hallmark of plain 
empirical questions, no matter how general or apparently ‘philosophical’ they may 
be, is that they can be “settled by going and looking” (or hearing, smelling, etc.) 
(758). 
Ultimately, the question will be how plain knowledge-claims can constitute 
legitimate, full-fledged knowledge despite treating the world as an “unquestionable 
context” and thereby taking for granted, without reasoned argument, the general 
propositions of common sense. As we’ll see, the traditional conception of the HES 
provides an answer to this question. But if we reject that conception, as Clarke 
thinks we must, then we will require a new explanation of the plain’s immunity to 
“outside undermining” (767). 
 
            
6 This passage is presented as a hypothetical—indeed, as part of a “day-dream.” But in the 
subsequent paragraph, Clarke writes that “[t]raditional epistemology is, in effect though not 
intentionally, the performance of this grand experiment” that he had just daydreamed about 
(NTE, 173). 
7  Clarke’s theory of perception is discussed in NTE and “Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects” 
(Clarke 1965), not in LS, so I’ll have little to say about it in what follows. Therefore, I would 
like to take this opportunity to complete the line of thought begun in this paragraph. Regarding 
the question “How much of object x can you actually see?”, Clarke argues that the full-bodied 
meaning of the question is in part a function of what the context or circumstance determines 
to be the default units: “Seeing is a function of the physical situation and the unit arrangement” 
(NTE, 119). Thus, “Seeing can, in a given physical situation, embrace a physical object, or half 
of one, or part of the surface of one, etc., depending on what amounts are fixed as the units” 
(NTE, 128). In everyday contexts, “physical objects” (rather than, e.g., surfaces or sense-data) 
are the default units for Seeing: “Sub-portions [of physical objects] are units only in special 
circumstances; in daily life it takes something special to remove the unit-hood of physical 
objects” (NTE, 190). 
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2.2 The Traditional Conception of the Human Epistemic Standpoint 
 
How does the traditional conception of the HES—what Clarke calls ‘the standard 
conceptual-human constitution’ (SCHC)—explain the immunity of plain utterances 
to “outside undermining”? 
First, what is the SCHC? Barry Stroud calls it “a certain conception of 
concepts, or what might be called ‘concept-use’” (Stroud 2000, 29), but it is more 
than that. The SCHC is a conception of the ‘human constitution’ as it pertains to 
the relations among ourselves, our concepts, and the world. Specifically, as we’ll 
see, Clarke argues that the SCHC is the conception of the HES that would make 
traditional philosophizing8 possible for human beings. 
We can characterize the SCHC by how it answers the following questions:  
 
(a)  Are concepts context-bound or context-free? 
(b)  How do concepts relate to their objects? 
(c)  How do we relate to concepts and their objects? 
 
The SCHC answers these questions as follows (760–1): 
 
1. Concepts are context-free: they are “self-sufficient unit[s],” or they “retain 
their identity” within conceptual schemes that are themselves “self-
sufficient unit[s].” 
2. The objects (or domains of objects) to which concepts relate are “fully 
separate from concepts.” 
3. Human beings “are outsiders” with respect to concepts, their objects, and 
the relation between the two. 
 
(1) To say that concepts (or the conceptual schemes to which they belong) are 
“self-sufficient” is to say that what they mean is fully determinable even when 
considered in isolation from everyday contexts: “Each concept or the conceptual 
scheme must be divorceable intact from our practices, from whatever constitutes 
the essential character of the plain, from elemental parts of our human nature” 
(760). 
(2) To say that objects (or domains of objects) are “fully separate from 
concepts” is to say that, just as concepts are self-sufficient with respect to objects, 
so objects are self-sufficient with respect to concepts. The individuation of objects 
(or domains of objects) in no way depends on our concepts. Concepts and objects 
are isolated, independent units. They retain the meaning (concepts) or being 
(objects) that they have for us regardless of context, circumstance, or the practices 
of everyday life. 
(3) To say that human beings are “outsiders” with respect to concepts, objects, 
and their relations is to say that, though they’re responsible for “‘creating’ 
concepts,” human beings are detached “observers” who seek, “usually by means of 
            
8  It is important to note that all general references to “philosophy” or “philosophizing” in LS 
are to traditional, as opposed to what I call ‘nontraditional,’ philosophy. For more on the 
traditional–nontraditional distinction, see §3.1, below, as well as Eichorn 2019, §1.3 and 
Eichorn 2020, §2. 
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[their] senses,” to “ascertain, when possible, whether items fulfill the conditions 
legislated by concepts.” According to this picture, human beings, “standing back 
detached” from both concepts and objects, attempt, “when possible,” to determine 
whether the concepts they have (in some sense) created succeed in referring to self-
sufficient objects, that is, objects whose being in no way depends on humans, their 
practices, or their concepts (761). 
Only the SCHC would enable us to philosophize because only such a 
constitution would enable us to adopt the standpoint of detached spectators with 
respect to independent concepts and objects. The alternative to the detached 
standpoint of the SCHC is an engaged standpoint, according to which objects and 
concepts are in some way bound up with us as knowers of the world and users of 
concepts. The worry is that an engaged standpoint would render our knowledge 
ultimately relative, that only the detached standpoint would allow us to ask and 
answer pure, absolutely objective questions—to philosophize, in other words. 
Figure 1 illustrates the detached standpoint of the SCHC. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: The Standard Conceptual-Human Constitution (I) 
 
It seems that the SCHC would make it possible for us to adopt what Thomas Nagel, 
who was influenced in these matters by Clarke’s teaching at Berkeley, calls “the 
view from nowhere,” meaning a view from nowhere within the world. The impulse 
to adopt the detached standpoint arises from a commitment to absolute objectivity. 
As Stroud puts it, 
 
This conception of what it is like to possess concepts, and to philosophize, 
expresses the traditional philosopher’s goal of complete or absolute 
objectivity. He wants to ask just how things are, not how we all think they 
are, or even how we in some sense must think they are. He wants to escape 
the restrictions and limitations of ordinary practical and scientific life and 
ask a question, so to speak ‘from outside’, about even those practical and 
scientific goings-on themselves. (Stroud 2000, 30) 
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Once properly understood, the SCHC can seem obviously correct. Though he 
takes issue with (1),9 Michael Williams argues that “(2) and (3) seem innocuous. 
Indeed, they seem innocuous because almost vacuous” (Williams 1991, 198). And 
to quote Stroud again: 
 
Isn’t everything said in characterizing the ‘standard’ conception obviously 
true? ... These remarks seem to express the very heart of objectivity, and 
to deny the slightest hint of psychologism or anthropocentrism. (Stroud 
2000, 37) 
 
However compelling it may be, though, the SCHC presents us with a difficult 
problem. It is part of our conception of the world that we ourselves are within the 
world. As Clarke says, some “items are aspects of ourselves,” and some concepts 
“‘hav[e] reference’ to aspects of one’s self” (761). An inability to philosophize would 
prevent us not only from “inquir[ing] what the objective fact really was, to raise 
an issue to be settled solely by the concepts and the item”; it would also prevent us 
from “assess[ing] our epistemological position objectively... The limiting eyeglasses 
of the restricted [i.e., the plain as traditionally conceived—more on this in §2.3] 
would prevent us from seeing, or even trying to see, things and ourselves and they 
and we really are” (761–2). 
In short, it would seem that if we are to achieve absolute objectivity “we must 




FIGURE 2: The Standard Conceptual-Human Constitution (II) 
 
It is, to put it mildly, not at all clear that human beings can adopt this sort of 
detached standpoint, one that stands back not only from concepts and the world, 
but also from ourselves as users of concepts and knowers of the world. 
 
            
9  Moreover, Williams claims that Clarke does not target (1) for criticism. This, however, is false. 
Indeed, as we’ll see in §4.3, (1) is Clarke’s principal target. 
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2.3 The Traditional Conception of Concepts 
 
The question with which we are presently concerned is how the traditional 
conception of the HES explains the immunity of plain knowing to outside 
undermining, where the ‘outside’ source is taken to be philosophical skepticism. 
As we’ve seen, according to the SCHC our concepts are inherently context-
free and self-sufficient: they are independent of both human knowers and the world. 
To be context-free is to be, in Clarke’s terms, “pure” (760). We ask “pure questions, 
etc.” by “stepping back” or “standing back from our experiencing” (761). If our 
concepts are inherently context-free or “pure,” then what are we doing when we 
deploy those concepts within everyday contexts? According to Clarke, the 
traditional view is that to contextualize inherently pure concepts is to restrict their 
scope. On this view, “plainness is restrictedness” (760). To philosophize is “to step 
outside the circle of the plain... outside the nonsemantical practice [of everyday 
life], then, speaking simple English [i.e., taking into account only the ‘skeletal 
meaning’ of our words], ask, affirm, assess, but, as a consequence, in unrestricted, 
untrammeled fashion” (760). 
On the traditional view of the plain, the plain man’s everyday “practice” is such 
that “for practical purposes he consistently ignores certain kinds of remote 
possibilities” (760). If they are properly understood—that is, if they are understood 
as presupposing the world—then plain empirical knowledge-claims can remain 
literally true even if they fail to accord with the absolutely objective facts of the 
matter. They cannot be faulted for presupposing the world and our perceptual–
epistemic relation to it, for it is built into the meaning or ‘structure’ of the claims 
themselves that they are presuppositional in this way. On the traditional view, the 
immunity of plain knowing is a function of the plain’s restrictedness: by saying 
(meaning, implying) less, plain claims open themselves to fewer legitimate 
challenges. 
Clarke makes the same point in NTE, where he frames it as an answer to the 
following question: What is the nature of the contribution of everyday contexts to 
the meaning of plain utterances? He describes the traditional view, which he rejects, 
this way: 
 
The rules of ordinary usage may legislate that every possibility, including 
any questioning the reality of the object, is always relevant. The non-rule-
like dimension may in daily life mitigate the severity of these rules, 
requiring that for a possibility questioning reality to be relevant it must 
be backed by a special reason. On this alternative, if this dimension were 
removed, then the rules would operate unchecked, requiring that we rule 
out every counter-possibility. (NTE, 182) 
 
This conception of the contribution of everyday contexts to the meaning of plain 
utterances embodies the traditional view of the everyday as restricted by practical 
ends, whereas philosophy is thought to engage in pure (unrestricted) inquiries into 
the absolutely objective truth of things. Philosophical knowing, Clarke writes in 
LS, requires “invulnerability,” which in turn requires that “we be able to ‘rule out’ 
any counterpossibility” (762–3; cf. 765, 768). On this view, “[t]hese so-called 
‘pragmatic considerations’ constitute the non-rule-like dimension” (NTE, 185). In 
§3.3, we’ll look at Clarke’s alternative account of the contribution to the meaning 
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of our everyday utterances of that “dimension” that he will later, in LS, refer to as 
“the plain.” 
 
2.4 The Airplane-Spotters 
 
In LS, Clarke illustrates the traditional conception of philosophizing as pure inquiry 
and the concomitant conception of the plain as restricted by way of the analogy of 
the wartime airplane-spotters. Stroud develops a version of the same example in 
Chapter 2 of Stroud 1984. The airplane-spotters are instructed to distinguish 
among ten types of enemy aircraft, types A–J, on the basis of a “checklist of features” 
(759). Stroud refers to the airplane-spotters’ “manuals” (Stroud 1984, 67), and I will 
do the same. The identification procedure yields purely or absolutely objective facts 
only if the aircrafts being spotted belong to one of the ten types. If older, antiquated 
aircraft (types X, Y, and Z) are spotted, then the technique will fail to distinguish 
them from any aircraft of types A–J: the identification procedure “specifies features 
sufficient for distinguishing the ten types one from another but none from X, Y, Z” 
(759). The airplane-spotters know of the existence of these older aircraft, and so 
know of the ultimate fallibility of their identification procedure, but they “are 
instructed to ignore” this complication due to “certain overriding practical 
advantages” (759). 
It is important to Clarke’s story that the airplane-spotters are not human 
beings like us. They “never dream or hallucinate,” and their “senses are unerring” 
(760). I take it that these qualifications are meant to preclude a number of familiar 
angles of skeptical attack. The airplane-spotters differ from us also in that they 
“have only the concepts presented [in the manual], plus any others needed for what 
the humanoids do, ask, and say in this state of affairs” (760). I take it that this 
qualification is meant to preclude skeptical attacks based on mundane ‘undefeated 
defeaters.’ In the absence of any concepts not directly required by the practice of 
airplane-spotting, the following type of skeptical queries would be impossible in the 
airplane-spotters’ “small, independent universe” (760): “But might it be that aircraft 
x is not an aircraft at all, but an aircraft-shaped balloon sent up to deceive you?” 
Given these qualifications, Clarke thinks that “[t]hese creatures... are not in a 
skeptical position,” for “[t]hey can know several kinds of objective empirical facts.” 
Not only can they know what certain aircraft are according to the identification 
procedure, they can also know, “if they ignore the restrictions on the identification 
procedure, the real type of an aircraft” (760).10 Given their infallible senses and the 
absence of any concepts that might be marshalled in an attempt to ‘defeat’ their 
apparent seeing of an aircraft, the airplane-spotters need only consult the 
deliverances of their senses and correlate those deliverances with the checklists 
contained in the manual. Figure 3 illustrates this everyday practice. Its concordance 
with the SCHC should be obvious. 
 
            
10 In fact, we must add one more stipulation if we are to conclude that the airplane-spotters can 
legitimately philosophize: we must, as Stroud points out, stipulate that they know that their 
manual is both complete and accurate (Stroud 1984, 80). 
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FIGURE 3: The Everyday Practice of an Airplane-Spotter 
 
Crucially, the everyday practice does not guarantee the absolutely objective truth 
of the belief of the airplane-spotter in Figure 3 that aircraft x is of type A, even if 
the airplane-spotter has fulfilled what Robert Fogelin calls her “epistemic 
responsibility” (Fogelin 1994, 26 ff.) by carefully and judiciously employing the 
identification procedure. It guarantees the truth only of the more restricted belief 
that, according to the identification procedure, aircraft x is of type A. Understood in 
this way, the assertion “Aircraft x is of type A” is both true and immune to 
undermining based on appeals to the purely objective facts regarding aircraft x, 
should those facts go beyond the limits of the identification procedure. Even if 
aircraft x is not of type A, it remains true that it is a type A aircraft according to the 
identification procedure. 
It is important to note that Clarke never abandons the traditional conception 
of the philosophical as the pure: it is “a truth” that “the philosophical is the pure” 
(760). What he will call into question is our ability to ask or answer pure 
philosophical questions. Nor does he abandon the view that the everyday is context-
bound in something like the manner of the airplane-spotters’ everyday practice. 
What he will call into question is the conception of the plain as restricted, for one 
thing skepticism teaches us is that we are as yet in no position to venture any 
general characterization of the plain. The conception of the plain as restricted is 
one that purports to view it from a philosophical standpoint, a standpoint outside 
the plain. Many philosophers clearly do attempt to adopt such a standpoint; indeed, 
when they are ‘in their studies’ they take for granted that they can succeed in the 
endeavor.11 But from that standpoint, there is only one way the plain can look. If 
there is an outside to the plain, then the plain must be restricted in some sense. As 
Stroud puts it, “Once one grasps the traditional epistemological project it is difficult 
to see the claims of everyday life as anything other than restricted” (Stroud 1984, 
127). 
            
11 Clarke writes: “How frustrating if we could ask only what the immaterial being asked 
concerning material objects or only what we asked a moment ago (the plain question) about 
dreaming! Something important would be denied us, which ‘inside our studies’ we seek, not 
questioning its availability” (759; emphasis added). 
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We’re now in a position to understand how the SCHC explains the immunity 
of plain knowing to philosophical skepticism, as well as its explanation of how 
philosophizing is (or would be) possible. The airplane-spotters can philosophize 
because their concepts are fundamentally pure and readily available in the sense that 
these pure concepts can be deployed as easily (and in the same way) as their 
restricted twins. In order to engage in a pure inquiry, the airplane-spotters need 
only prescind their discourse from the everyday contexts that restrict the scope of 
their utterances. The results of such an inquiry might seem to contradict the results 
of context-bound inquiries; but this apparent contradiction does not invalidate 
context-bound conclusions. Though the airplane-spotters are capable of identifying 
any aircraft x as being (e.g.) of the antiquated type Z, the purely objective fact of 
the matter has no impact on the correctness of their (epistemically responsible) 
claim, within the context of the wartime practice, that that same aircraft x belongs 
to type A. Thus, their context-bound claims are immune from outside undermining. 
In the same way, the SCHC also provides an account of the structure of the 
plain, “the character and source of its relative ‘non-objectivity’” (769)—though here 
we can dispense with the square-quotes. The character of the plain’s relative non-
objectivity is its restrictedness; the source of its restrictedness is the pragmatic 
constraints imposed by everyday contexts. These pragmatic constraints constitute 
the structure of the plain. If the SCHC were the HES, then there would be no 
problem of the structure of the plain, for we would know precisely what that 
structure is (or, at least, we would know how to go about determining its shape in 
any given circumstance). 
Clarke wants to convince us, however, that a close study of philosophical 
skepticism demonstrates that the SCHC cannot be the actual HES. It follows that 
we must reject the SCHC and, with it, the traditional accounts of how 
philosophizing is possible for human beings, how the (human) plain is immune from 
outside undermining, and ultimately, what the structure of the plain itself is. 
 
3 Common Sense and Its Discontents 
 
Why does Clarke think that the actual HES cannot be of the “standard type,” and 
why does he think that a close study of philosophical skepticism demonstrates as 
much? These questions will occupy us for the remainder of this paper. 
 
3.1 Common Sense as Epistemic Bedrock 
 
Let’s return to the airplane-spotters. Their knowledge of aircraft types, whether 
plain or philosophical, is grounded in their (presumably) complete and accurate 
grasp of all existing types of aircraft and the marks and features that identify them. 
This is the justificatory foundation of their empirical knowledge-claims regarding 
aircraft. The concepts deployed in their utterances are inherently and (given that 
the airplane-spotters do not dream or hallucinate, etc.) unproblematically pure, i.e., 
context-free and absolutely objective. Thus, the airplane-spotters can philosophize. 
But they can also have plain or everyday knowledge of the sort that is common 
among human beings. To do so, they need only engage in a shared practice that 
restricts the scope of their utterances by ruling out certain counterpossibilities. In 
those cases, the restricted concepts are parasitic upon their pure counterparts: the 
airplane-spotters can make sense of ‘a type-A aircraft (according to the 
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identification procedure)’ only because they have prior knowledge of type-A 
aircrafts per se. Pure concepts are fundamental; plain versions of those concepts are 
derivative. 
But what grounds our knowledge? Can we make sense of ourselves on the 
model of the airplane-spotters? To begin with, we need to note all the ways in which 
human beings differ from the “humanoids” in their “small, independent universe.” 
Unlike them, we dream and hallucinate; our senses are not unerring (or at least it is 
not obvious that they are unerring);12 and our conceptual universe is huge and 
open-ended. Obviously, then, any account of the SCHC involving human beings is 
going to be very different from, and far more complicated than, the example of the 
airplane-spotters. 
As we saw in §2.1, Clarke maintains that, in extremis, our plain empirical 
knowledge-claims can be justified by appeal to the general propositions of Common 
Sense (CS).13 When one is working within an everyday context, the general CS 
beliefs are unquestionable, which accounts for the immunity of plain knowing to 
outside undermining. According to CS, we dream and hallucinate—but not all the 
time; our senses deceive us—but not all the time; and while we have loads of 
conceptual resources that can be deployed to challenge our knowledge-claims, no 
such challenges invalidate the basic CS propositions. 
What about our philosophical knowledge-claims? Here, we can divide 
philosophers roughly into two camps: those who think that the general CS beliefs 
require independent (noncircular) justification when philosophizing and those who 
think that they do not.14 Following Clarke, we can refer to the first group as 
traditional philosophers or, more narrowly, traditional epistemologists. To call into 
question the fundamental CS beliefs is to call into question our knowledge of the 
external world; hence, “traditional epistemology is concerned with our knowledge 
of the external world” (NTE, 40). Though Clarke does not use the term, I will refer 
to the second group as nontraditional philosophers. 
Perhaps the most prominent brand of nontraditional philosophy is the 
commonsense philosophies of figures such as Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore. Reid 
expresses his nontraditional orientation when he laments that “philosophers, 
pitying the credulity of the vulgar, resolve to have no faith but what is founded 
upon reason. They apply to philosophy to furnish them with reasons for the belief 
of those things which all mankind have believed, without being able to give any 
reason for it.” Alas, these “great men... have not been able, from all the treasures of 
philosophy, to draw one argument that is fit to convince a man that can reason, of 
            
12 Kant may be right that “truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in 
the judgment about it insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not 
err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all” (Kant 
1998, 384; A293/B350). That said, it is an entirely ordinary way of speaking to refer to our 
senses deceiving us—namely, deceiving us into thinking (judging) that false things are true. 
13 Isn’t it correct to say that the airplane-spotters’ knowledge is also ultimately grounded in such 
general CS propositions? In a sense, yes. But to anticipate points I make later in this section, 
the airplane-spotters have no need to formulate or appeal to the general CS propositions, for 
they do not dream or hallucinate, their senses are unerring, etc. 
14 Laurence BonJour writes that “[t]here are, broadly speaking, only two main sorts of answers” 
to the “basic meta-epistemological question” of how to justify an epistemology: “On the one 
hand, one may appeal to the deliverances of common-sense (and ‘ordinary language’), arguing 
that an epistemological theory is acceptable if and only if it is congruent in some specified way 
with those deliverances. Or, on the other hand, one may reject the appeal to Common-sense 
as ultimately question-begging and attempt instead the perhaps quixotic task of constructing 
an independent, theoretical justification of one’s epistemological theory” (BonJour 1979, 157–
8). 
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the existence of any one thing without him” (Reid 1892, 79). Reid proposes that the 
fundamental mistake of these (traditional) philosophers is that, 
 
from a natural prejudice in [philosophy’s] favor, [they] have 
endeavoured to extend her jurisdiction beyond its just limits, and to call 
to her bar the dictates of Common Sense. But these decline her 
jurisdiction; they disdain the trial of reasoning, and disown its authority; 
they neither claim its aid, nor dread its attacks... [F]or, in reality, 
Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But, on 
the other hand, Philosophy (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) 
has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of 
them, and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its 
honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots. (Reid 1892, 81) 
 
According to Reid, any attempt to call into question the general CS beliefs leads 
inevitably to the theoretical ‘death’ and ‘rot’ characteristic of skepticism. 
Here, Reid refers to “the belief of those things which all mankind have 
believed.” It may be true that all human beings (or near enough) have believed, say, 
“that there is a sun, moon, and stars” (Reid 1892, 79), but is it right to say that all 
human beings have believed “principles of Common Sense” such as “there is life and 
intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse” (Reid 2002, 482)? What 
about the general CS propositions that Clarke identifies? We’ve seen that Clarke 
himself refers to them, both in NTE and LS, as beliefs; yet they are not the sort of 
thing that we usually think or utter, certainly not in the course of everyday life. 
Indeed, outside of philosophical discussions, it is rare that the general CS 
propositions would be so much as formulated, let alone believed, except perhaps 
tacitly or in some other attenuated and hard-to-define sense. It seems to me that 
the right way to put it is that, initially and for the most part, we take the general CS 
propositions for granted. But what does that come down to? Stated differently, how 
do we arrive at the general CS propositions such that we come to see that, in some 
sense, we were committed to them all along? 
 
3.2 The Emergence of Common Sense 
 
The traditional view is that the general CS propositions emerge when, either in the 
face of a challenge to a particular empirical knowledge-claim or just out of an 
interest in what ultimately justifies such knowledge-claims, we engage in a kind of 
justificational archaeology: we dig down under our beliefs in search of the bedrock 
on which they rest. Briefly stated, the procedure goes as follows. We begin with a 
particular everyday utterance, such as “I’m certain there is a tomato there” (NTE, 
42). Next, we decontextualize the utterance: we remove it from any and all everyday 
contexts (e.g., making a sandwich, putting together a grocery list, etc.). Finally, we 
restate the claim in general terms. Thus, “I’m certain there is a tomato there” 
becomes “We can be certain that there are physical objects” (NTE, 42; cf. NTE, 25). 
Let me explain this sequence in more detail. First, not just any sort of particular 
everyday empirical knowledge-claim will do. On this point, Stroud and Cavell—
both of whom were deeply influenced by Clarke15—are in some ways clearer than 
Clarke is. To serve the traditional epistemologist’s purpose, the knowledge-claim 
            
15 See §1 of Eichorn 2021, which appears in this issue of Sképsis. 
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that is examined must represent, as Stroud puts it, “a best-possible case of that 
kind,” meaning that it must be “representative of the best position any of us can 
ever be in for knowing things about the world around us on the basis of the senses” 
(Stroud 1984, 9–10); it must be, Cavell writes, a “‘best’ case for knowing,” meaning 
that it is “one which we should all recognize as holding the best prospect of 
certainty” (Cavell 1979, 133). Best-cases for knowing are such that “[a] negative 
verdict in the chosen case would support a negative verdict everywhere else” 
(Stroud 1984, 10): “What ‘best case’ turns out to mean” is that “[i]f I know 
anything, I know this” (Cavell 1979, 145). It is for this reason that traditional 
epistemologists tend to focus on simple cases, such as seeing a tomato or a piece of 
paper. Such cases involve what Cavell calls “generic objects” (Cavell 1979, 52)—a 
bird or an animal, but not (as in J.L. Austin’s example) a goldfinch (Austin 1970, 
83).16 
In NTE, Clarke contrasts the sort of cases considered by traditional 
epistemologists to even more obviously unsuitable cases. He imagines a brilliant 
detective investigating a murder in which the main suspect has what appears to be 
an airtight alibi: the occupant of the room adjoining his (a trustworthy fellow) heard 
the suspect typing at the time of the murder. But, the detective points out, the 
suspect “is a hi-fi enthusiast with excellent equipment,” and it’s possible that he had 
put on “a long-playing record of typing, meanwhile sneaking out of his room and 
returning after committing the murder” (NTE, 30). In this way, “[t]he detective 
showed that we didn’t know a certain objective empirical fact,” but “[i]n showing 
that we don’t know that the suspect was in his room typing the detective has not 
shown that we can have no knowledge of any objective empirical facts” (NTE, 41). 
The crucial difference between the detective’s case and a traditional 
epistemologist’s case is, Clarke argues, that “every particular claim which an 
epistemologist examines has a special relationship to its corresponding common-
sense belief: it is a particular instance of such a belief; if one of these particular claims 
is invalid, then its corresponding common-sense belief is invalid” (NTE, 42). 
The second step is to decontextualize the suitably simple, generic knowledge-
claim. To decontextualize an utterance is to expel it from the plain. To fall outside 
the plain is to fall into the domain of the philosophical. Thus, this second step 
involves turning at least potential “cases of daily life” into what Clarke calls 
“philosophical cases” (NTE, 197, 181). Decontextualized (i.e., philosophical) 
knowledge-claims are no longer bound up with our practices; they no longer enjoy 
immunity from outside undermining. Their sentential content remains unchanged, 
but their meaning has been cut free from the non-rule-like dimension of the 
everyday. Everyday inquiries into the truth or falsity of plain knowledge-claims 
“are the joint product of rules of [language] usage and a non-rule-like dimension,” 
but “[e]pistemological inquiries are the product solely of these rules” (NTE, 229). 
In other words, evaluations of decontextualized knowledge-claims take into 
account only the “skeletal meaning” of those claims. 
The thought behind decontextualization is that “these [i.e., philosophical] 
cases are the ones to be worked with. These cases, as opposed to those of daily life, 
are primary; the cases of daily life are somehow less fundamental than philosophical 
cases” (NTE, 232). Philosophical cases are more fundamental than everyday ones 
because of the third step, in which we restate the particular knowledge-claim in 
            
16 Cavell adds that, in distinguishing “generic” from “specific” objects, he is trying only “to 
summarize the spirit in which an object is under discussion... While I do not think it accidental 
that such a thing as a goldfinch does not make an appearance in traditional epistemology, I do 
not wish to insist that one could not have appeared; but only that, if it were to, its function 
would be, or become, that of a generic object” (Cavell 1979, 53). 
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general terms. The result is the statement of a general CS proposition. In other 
words, decontextualizing a particular knowledge-claim transforms it into “a 
particular instance of” a “corresponding [general] common-sense belief” (NTE, 42; 
NTE, 235), and it is presumed that our plain knowledge rests upon such CS beliefs. 
Thus, “[t]he epistemologist’s case constitutes the core of cases of daily life” (NTE, 
176). If our goal is to interrogate the ultimate justificatory grounds of our everyday 
empirical knowledge-claims, then we must bring to the surface and then 
interrogate the fundamental CS propositions: “If one is examining the truth of these 
common-sense beliefs one must work with philosophical cases, not real cases” (NTE, 
237). 
 
3.3 Philosophical Common Sense (CSph) 
 
In short, traditional philosophy strives, among other things, to interrogate the 
ultimate rational grounds of our everyday knowledge-claims. In the case of 
everyday empirical knowledge-claims, which are thought to rest ultimately on 
Clarke’s general CS propositions, this means interrogating the legitimacy of those 
CS propositions. This is the primary task of traditional epistemology as Clarke 
understands it: “The subject with which traditional epistemology is concerned is 
our knowledge of the world. Traditional epistemology begins its investigation of 
this knowledge by considering so-called common sense beliefs about empirical 
knowledge” (NTE, 5). In “considering” the general CS propositions, traditional 
epistemology treats them, at least temporarily and for methodological purposes, as 
mere arbitrary assumptions. Consequently, any uncritical assent to CS is deemed 
dogmatic. This is, of course, the most common charge leveled against Moore: that 
his arguments are “impotently dogmatic” (754; cf. 757). 
Traditional epistemology, then, takes itself to begin with the general CS 
propositions. Clarke agrees. Interestingly, however, he also rejects a view he finds 
to be “[c]ommon to virtually all critiques of traditional epistemology,” namely, 
“that philosophy begins after the common-sense beliefs. On this idea what is 
philosophical, that is, what is suspicious, are the examinations of common sense. 
Philosophers are alleged to have repudiated common sense for (mistaken) 
philosophical reasons” (NTE, 239–40). A common charge is that, in their inquiries, 
skeptics—i.e., traditional epistemologists—are “using ‘know’ in a special sense 
(way), as requiring of knowing much more than is appropriate for empirical 
knowledge and, for this reason, denying what [so-called CS] maintains” (762). 
Against this, Clarke wants to convince us that “the skeptic is innocent, without an 
independent thought in his head concerning what knowing requires, the submissive 
slave of [so-called CS]” (762). By “so-called common sense”—a phrase that appears 
throughout NTE—Clarke is referring to what he will call, in LS, philosophical CS 
(CSph), “those general propositions which answer general philosophical questions 
affirmatively” (759).17 CSph “[dictates] that knowing meet a certain requirement,” 
namely, “invulnerability,” which requires “that to know ___ we be able to ‘rule out’ 
            
17 With only one clear exception—the second occurrence of “common sense” in the following 
passage: “Common sense has really little or nothing to do with common sense” (NTE, 240–1)—
all or nearly all references to CS in NTE are to what Clarke often, but not always, calls “so-
called common sense.” That CS in NTE just is what he will call, in LS, CSph is confirmed here: 
“... there are two crucial relationships between common sense and philosophical cases. 
Common-sense beliefs are completely meaningful if and only if assertions like ‘I know there is a 
tomato there’ are completely meaningful in philosophical cases. And common-sense beliefs 
are valid if and only if such particular claims made in philosophical cases are valid” (NTE, 237). 
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any counterpossibility to ___, any possibility which, if it were realized, would falsify 
___” (762–3). But why does philosophy place this requirement on knowing? We 
already have the beginning of an answer: to philosophize is to take into account 
only the rule-like dimension of language, shorn of the non-rule-like dimension of 
meaning provided by everyday contexts. But why should discounting the non-rule-
like dimension have this consequence? 
As we’ve seen, the traditional view holds that such a strong epistemic 
requirement is built into the rules of language. If we allow these rules to apply 
unchecked by contextual restrictions, then the epistemic requirement will hold. 
We’ve also seen, however, that Clarke rejects the traditional view. Even so, he 
maintains that philosophical knowing does indeed require invulnerability—or, 
more precisely, he argues that it is “conditionally objectively determined” that 
philosophical knowing requires invulnerability (cf. NTE, 206). What does this 
mean, and how does it relate to Clarke’s rejection of the view “that philosophy begins 
after the common-sense beliefs” (NTE, 239)? 
To begin sorting this out, we need to look at Clarke’s own preferred account 
of the contribution of everyday contexts to our full-bodied utterances. As we saw 
in §2.3, the traditional view of the nature of the semantic contribution of everyday 
contexts holds that everyday contexts “mitigate the severity” of the rules of 
language, which, when operating “unchecked,” require “that we rule out every 
counter-possibility” (NTE, 182). On this view, these restrictive “‘pragmatic 
considerations’” (NTE, 185) constitute the structure of the plain. Alternatively, 
 
The non-rule-like dimension may... supply the criterion of relevancy/ 
irrelevancy of possibilities questioning reality. On this alternative the 
rules for “certain” would say nothing about whether such possibilities 
were relevant; the rules would leave this to be determined by context in 
its broadest sense, according to which “daily life” would be one such 
context, mathematics another. In the philosophical case special 
possibilities questioning reality [e.g., dreams, hallucinations, futuristic 
physiologists, etc.] would be neither relevant nor irrelevant; there would 
be no criterion for the relevancy/irrelevancy... According to [this 
alternative] the philosophical case would be essentially incomplete. In 
daily life the non-rule-like dimension would not just mitigate the rules. 
These rules would be incomplete in themselves; they would have to be 
filled in by the criterion supplied by this dimension. (NTE, 182–4) 
 
Note that the traditional view would be correct if the SCHC were the actual HES. 
Thus, Clarke’s alternative account of the semantic contribution of everyday 
contexts provides a clue as to what an alternative account of the HES might look 
like. On this alternative, the plain does not restrict meaning; it completes it. 
 
3.4 Traditional Epistemology’s Critique of CSph 
 
In the absence of a criterion of the relevancy/irrelevancy of counterpossibilities, 
philosophical utterances are indeterminate: there is no fully objective fact of the 
matter regarding what we might call the ‘semantic scope’ of philosophical 
utterances. Possibilities involving dreams, hallucinations, or futuristic 
physiologists are not irrelevant in philosophical cases, as they are in everyday 
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cases;18 but neither is it the case that they are relevant. Even so, Clarke insists that, 
though it is not “fully objectively determined,” it is “conditionally objectively 
determined” in philosophical cases that all counterpossibilities to p must be ruled 
out if we are legitimately to claim to know (philosophically) that p (NTE, 206). 
What accounts for this conditional objective determination? Clarke’s answer 
turns on “the philosopher’s assumption” that philosophical utterances are full-bodied 
in meaning (NTE, 206). In this, the traditional philosopher is mistaken. But so are 
Austinian ordinary-language philosophers, who “have been urging for some time... 
that ordinary language does not make any sense in these [philosophical] cases.” 
Clarke maintains instead that “language in these cases has some meaning, viz., 
skeletal meaning, which conditionally objectively determines the epistemologist’s 
inquiry” (NTE, 232). Skeletal meaning has this effect because, Clarke argues, the 
traditional epistemologist, assuming that philosophical utterances are fully 
meaningful, “does... what is required to make [philosophical utterances] fully meaningful” 
(NTE, 217). In LS, Clarkes writes that “[t]he fewer the contextual features [of an 
utterance], the more option we have, the larger the role of our decision and resolve” 
(757). The traditional epistemologist resolves to understand philosophical 
utterances as fully meaningful, which requires supplying a criterion of the 
relevancy of counterpossibilities. Since he notes, correctly, that all counter-
possibilities are equally relevant in philosophical cases—and, crucially, since the 
equal irrelevancy of all counterpossibilities would preclude philosophical utterances 
from attaining full-bodied meaning—he decides that it is true, as the tradition has 
assumed, that philosophical knowing requires ruling out all counterpossibilities. He 
does this because (for reasons Clarke lays out in great detail, but which I will pass 
over here) he feels that this is what he “should” do (cf. NTE, 214–5): “What the 
traditional epistemologist does in ‘really meaning’ his [skeptical or ‘paradoxical’]19 
conclusion is produce the kind of situation in which the statement is [fully] 
meaningful and true” (NTE, 227).20 He can “produce” the “situation” because, again, 
the lack of contextual constraints on any utterance p opens up a space for “our 
decision and resolve” in choosing how to understand p (757). 
Now we arrive at a crucial stage of Clarke’s account of traditional-
epistemological inquiry. Given that, in philosophical cases, particular utterances are 
to be understood as instances of general CS propositions, “we can now see” that 
“the philosopher’s assumption that ordinary language is completely meaningful in 
philosophical cases is... really the assumption that the general common-sense beliefs 
are completely meaningful.” Traditional epistemology, Clarke notes, “examines... 
the truth, not the meaningfulness, of the common-sense beliefs; it assumes that these 
beliefs are meaningful” (NTE, 237). But given (a) that it is conditionally objectively 
determined that all counterpossibilities are relevant in philosophical cases, and (b) 
that such an epistemic requirement leads to skepticism (i.e., the rejection of CSph), 
            
18 In everyday contexts, Clarke writes, skeptical doubts “are ignorable—either absurd, irrelevant, 
or out of place” (755). 
19 On the relation between ‘skeptical’ and ‘paradoxical’ in NTE, see NTE, 43, and my comments 
on it at Eichorn 2019, 50n1. 
20 With respect to Seeing, Clarke argues that traditional epistemologists perform a “mental act” 
that makes it true (for them, as long as they sustain the mental act) that they can see only sense-
data (NTE, 84; cf. NTE, 98). Their mistake is to think that what they see as a result of this 
mental act is the same as what they (and the rest of us) see in everyday life (NTE, 138). (In an 
early lecture course, Heidegger reaches the same conclusions: see Heidegger 2008, 66–8.) The 
same is true in the case of Knowing, which is why Clarke claims that the traditional 
epistemologist does what it takes not just to make his skeptical conclusion fully meaningful, 
but also true (for him, for as long as he sustains the mental act). For an account of this mental 
act, see Eichorn 2019, §3.5.1; applied to Knowing, see §5.2.2. 
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then “traditional epistemology shows that common sense, if fully meaningful, is to 
be repudiated as incorrect” (NTE, 238). 
Regarding (b): Though Clarke rarely speaks in terms of skepticism in NTE, in 
one place he writes that “[t]he importance of this requirement of special reasons 
[i.e., of rejecting the view that all counterpossibilities are relevant when assessing 
knowledge-claims] cannot be over-emphasized. It stands between the plain man 
and scepticism about the physical world” (NTE, 153). Given that it is conditionally 
objectively determined that the requirement of special reasons is suspended when 
doing traditional philosophy, this amounts to saying that skepticism is the 
conditionally objectively determined result of traditional epistemology.21 
What makes CSph philosophical is that its propositions require that to know 
them we must be able to rule out all counterpossibilities. But philosophy does not 
itself impose this requirement; rather, it is an imposition that results from doing 
“what is required” to make philosophical utterances fully meaningful (NTE, 216–
7). As we’ve seen, Clarke rejects the view that philosophizing begins with CSph, that 
“what is philosophical, that is, what is suspicious, are the examinations of common 
sense” (NTE, 240). He wants to convince us instead that “[p]hilosophizing ends 
with the common-sense beliefs” (NTE, 240). What is philosophical and suspicious, 
Clarke argues, is the epistemic requirement imposed on CS. In short, the general 
propositions of CSph are “the product of a large piece of philosophizing about 
empirical knowledge done before [the skeptic] comes on stage” (754). The 
traditional epistemologist (i.e., the skeptic), “performing kinds of inquiries he 
performs in daily life,” simply draws the correct conclusion regarding our knowledge 
of the general CSph propositions given the assumption that those propositions (and 
the skeptical questions challenging them) are fully meaningful. “There is, as I 
should like to put it, no philosophy in the basic traditional epistemological inquiries 
which examine common sense. Philosophizing ends with the common-sense beliefs” 
(NTE, 240).22 
Clarke concludes that “[c]ommon sense really has little or nothing to do with 
common sense. These so-called beliefs are the product of philosophizing—though of 
the most natural, immediate, and compelling kind—and, in a certain respect, seem 
to be a priori” (NTE, 240–1). The idea of “a plain species of Common Sense (CSpl)” 
(757)—so central to LS—is absent from NTE. In NTE, common sense just is CSph. 
What is philosophical about CS, Clarke writes, is that 
 
there is implicit [in the general CS propositions] a conception of the 
nature of empirical knowledge. This conception is that empirical 
knowledge is independent of what I have referred to as the non-rule-like 
dimension. The common-sense beliefs are assertions that we can know 
and see physical objects, and these assertions are themselves independent 
of that dimension. (NTE, 241) 
            
21 Cf. NTE, 247: “The significance of traditional epistemology lies in its having traced out the 
fact that if knowing and seeing must be independent of the non-rule-like dimension [which is 
what imposes the requirement of special reasons] then we can know and see very little indeed.” 
22 It might seem that, in LS, Clarke contradicts this when he writes that “[the skeptic’s] inquisition 
of CSph is philosophical” (766). But I don’t think there’s any real contradiction here. Clarke’s 
point in LS is that “[t]he skeptic has had one foot within the philosophical, the other within 
the plain” (765–6). The skeptic’s examination of CSph is philosophical only in the sense that 
CSph itself is philosophical—which is the same point he makes in NTE, though without the 
terminology of plain and philosophical CS. 
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Given how “natural, immediate, and compelling” this piece of philosophizing is—
indeed, so much so that the general propositions of CSph “seem to be a priori”—the 
philosophical conception of knowledge built into CS has a “felt necessity” (NTE, 
242): “it seems necessarily true that genuine empirical knowledge, and genuine 
perception, must not depend in any way on this non-rule-like dimension” (NTE, 
241).23 
In a passage that is crucial both within NTE and for understanding the ways 
in which LS moves beyond that earlier work, Clarke writes: “I think that everyone 
succumbs to the conception [of empirical knowledge] implicit in the common-
sense beliefs as soon as he begins thinking in general terms about empirical 
knowledge” (NTE, 243). Indeed, we may succumb even sooner, if only implicitly, 
for the general CS propositions represent, Clarke says in one place, “deeply 
ingrained beliefs about knowledge and the world which the plain man unthinkingly 
holds” (NTE, 62). For Clarke, what is so peculiar about Moore is that this is not 
true of him: his general CS propositions are “in general logical type” identical to 
everyday propositions (755). This means that the “‘general propositions of 
Common Sense’ that Moore sets out to uphold” (754) are plain, “even though very 
general and context-free” (755).24 Unlike CSph beliefs, which “are not talking about 
the claims made by the plain man in daily life” (NTE, 235), CSpl beliefs are about 
such everyday claims. The peculiarity of CSpl lies in the fact that its propositions 
are plain but not everyday—they are the sole exceptions that prevent us from 
concluding, with traditional epistemologists and ordinary-language philosophers 
alike, that the plain and the everyday coincide. 
I will return to Moore in §4.4. Now I want to look at the conclusions that 
Clarke draws from his reflections in NTE. If the propositions of CSph are fully 
meaningful, then the traditional-epistemological examination of CSph is valid. But 
if the traditional-epistemological examination of CSph is valid, then philosophical 
skepticism is correct.25 Thus, if CSph were fully meaningful, then its propositions 
would be false. But it is not fully meaningful. By the same token, philosophical 
skepticism is not fully meaningful. Therefore, “CSph and its skeptical denial should 
both be erased from the books” (762), from which it follows that “the only correct 
answers” to philosophical questions “amount to rejecting the question” (NTE, 201; 
cf. Clarke 1965, 107). 
What, then, has been shown? CSph beliefs “constitute a faulty conceptualization 
of empirical knowledge” (NTE, 143), yet that conceptualization is our 
conceptualization, one that we ‘unthinkingly hold’ or (if we’re not G.E. Moore) 
‘succumb to’ the moment we start thinking in general terms about empirical 
knowledge. We must appreciate, Clarke tells us, “the apparent inconceivability of 
any alternative” (NTE, 242) to this faulty conceptualization of empirical 
knowledge. If we do, then we will appreciate “the significance of traditional 
epistemology”—“the depth of truth in traditional epistemology” (NTE, 231)—
which “is that we do not understand empirical knowledge” (NTE, 143; cf. NTE, 
241) and “that there is no valid defense of common sense” available to us (NTE, 
            
23 Recall Michael Williams’s remark that two of the three aspects of the SCHC “seem innocuous 
because almost vacuous” (Williams 1991, 198) and Stroud’s rhetorical question, “Isn’t 
everything said in characterizing the ‘standard’ conception obviously true?” (Stroud 2000, 37). 
24 We can see, then, that Michael Williams fundamentally misunderstands Clarke when he claims 
that Clarke “argues that Moore’s propositions belong to ‘philosophical common sense’” 
(Williams 1991, 180). Moore, Clarke concludes, is “the inveterate plain man, for whom there 
is nothing outside the circle of the plain” (758). 
25 This is Clarke’s way of stating what Stroud calls “the ‘conditional correctness’ of skepticism” 
(Stroud 1984, 179). 
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239). Since “[t]here is at the present time in philosophy no answer to traditional 
epistemology” (NTE, 247), it is an “illusion” that J.L. Austin or anyone else has 
“successfully answered Scepticism and explained how we can have empirical 
knowledge” (NTE, 243). We must either accept that skepticism is correct or “try 
to make sense of how knowing and seeing can be genuine even though essentially 
dependent on” the non-rule-like dimension of the everyday (NTE, 248; cf. NTE, 
242), i.e., on “the (yet unknown) structure of the plain” (765). 
 
4 The Skeptical Critique of CSph and Its Legacy 
 
The questions with which we’re presently concerned are why Clarke thinks (a) that 
the actual HES cannot be of the “standard type” and (b) that a close study of 
philosophical skepticism demonstrates as much. Given the ground covered in §3, 
we are now in an excellent position to understand how Clarke attempts to establish 
these conclusions in LS. 
 
4.1 Plain Knowing and the Appearance–Reality Distinction 
 
First, I want to ask what, on the traditional view, would the traditional-
epistemological critique of CSph show vis-à-vis our plain knowledge were it to end 
in philosophical skepticism (SKph)? Specifically, would it show that our plain 
knowledge-claims are simply invalid? How could that be, given that, as we’ve seen, 
the tradition holds that the plain is immune to philosophical-skeptical assault on 
account of its restrictedness? 
In his initial statement of the immunity thesis, Clarke writes that “the 
epistemic is immune (oversimplifying slightly) from skeptical assault” (754). De-
simplified, the thesis is that plain knowing is immune from skeptical doubts if those 
doubts are 
 
... “implained,” that is, if [they are] raised inside these [everyday] 
contexts, without “changing the subject,” directly against the epistemic, to 
show such claims unequivocally wrong... [I]t is skeptical doubts so raised, 
with this intention, from which the plain is immune, for implained doubts 
are ignorable—either absurd, irrelevant, or out of place. (755) 
 
The first thing to note about this passage is that it says that plain claims are 
immune only from “implained” skeptical doubts. As I understand it, only non-plain 
utterances can be ‘implained.’26 Thus, only philosophical utterances can be 
implained. But since plain and philosophical verbal twins do not mean, say, or imply 
the same thing, then to implain a philosophical utterance is to misunderstand it, to 
distort its intended meaning. The plain and the philosophical are, Clarke writes, 
“unmixable types... [T]o raise a pure question... and allow an affirmative settlement 
            
26 I’ve found that there is significant disagreement on this point, so let me say a bit more. As I 
read it, “implained” is primarily a verb, like “implanted” or “impregnated.” Clarke’s adjectival 
use of the term is derivative. True, “implained” does specify that a particular utterance is 
“within the plain,” but that use of the term incorporates, I take it, the connotation that the 
utterance is within the plain because of the act of implaining it. Thus, as I read it, the immunity 
thesis does not automatically rule-out plain (but not implained) skepticism. 
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by” a plain proposition “is confusing the stakes, to pay off a debt of a million dollars 
with a million lire” (764). So the first qualification on the plain’s immunity to SKph 
is that that immunity requires misunderstanding the skeptical challenge. 
Misunderstanding SKph in this way tends to make it seem “absurd.” But skeptical 
challenges might instead have the effect of “changing the subject,” e.g., from science 
to philosophy. Short of changing the subject, however, SKph is “irrelevant” in a plain 
context, since the requirement of special reasons is operative there. 
Finally, the plain is immune to SKph only if the skeptical challenge is raised 
“directly against the epistemic, to show such claims unequivocally wrong,” i.e., 
wrong even qua plain. Such doubts are “out of place” even by the tradition’s own 
lights, for if a claim is not intended to be understood as reflecting the absolutely 
objective facts of the matter, then that claim is not necessarily falsified by pointing 
to a possibility that, if realized, would demonstrate its failure to reflect the 
absolutely objective facts of the matter. Clarke writes that it is “CSph” that “the real 
skeptic cross-examines directly” (759). Obviously, the “epistemic” (i.e., what is 
known or claimed to be known) referred to in stating the immunity thesis is known 
(or claimed to be known) plainly, not philosophically. Thus, even if the immune 
proposition being skeptically challenged is a general CS proposition, it must be a 
proposition of CSpl and hence is not what “the real skeptic” is examining “directly.” 
SKph, then, is not “raised... directly against the [plain] epistemic,” and it can be 
construed as doing so only by being “implained.” Consequently, SKph is incapable 
of showing that apparently true plain knowledge-claims are “unequivocally wrong.” 
This does not mean, however, that SKph, if successful, would fail to undermine 
plain knowledge-claims. Recall that, on the traditional view, CSph is thought to be 
the epistemic ground of the plain. Thus, on the traditional view, if he were 
successful in assaulting CSph, the skeptic would have “indirectly and partially 
undermined the plain also”: he would have shown that “[p]lain knowing” is, when 
“viewed from an absolutely objective perspective, ‘knowing’ in a manner of speaking 
only” (767). This whole way of thinking is rooted in the idea (which is built into the 
SCHC) that pure concepts are fundamental while restricted concepts are derivative. 
True or genuine knowledge-claims are philosophical; their restricted twins can still 
count as knowledge, but only “in a manner of speaking.” 
As we’ve seen, Clarke illustrates the traditional conception of the plain, the 
philosophical, and their relation by way of the analogy of the airplane-spotters. But 
he also considers a human (i.e., non-fantastical) example. A scientist is experi-
menting with soporifics on himself. In his records, he writes: 
 
“1:00 P.M. Taking x dose of drug Z orally... 1:15 P.M. Beginning to feel 
drowsy. I am not focusing clearly on... 6:15 P.M. I’ve been asleep but am 
wide awake now, rested and feeling normal. I know, of course, that I’m not 
dreaming now, but I remember, while asleep, actually thinking I was really 
awake, not dreaming...” (758) 
 
On its face, the italicized portion of the experimenter’s record seems, given that it 
is a legitimate (and presumably true) knowledge-claim, to answer the following 
question affirmatively: “Can we ever know that we’re not dreaming?” (758). In a 
sense, of course, it does answer that question; but it does not answer “our intended 
philosophical question” (758). It fails to do so because, as uttered by the 
experimenter, the claim that she knows that she is not dreaming now is not being 
treated as an instance of a general CSph proposition. This becomes evident if we 
imagine Descartes “enter[ing] into the experiment, asking philosophically, ‘But how 
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can you know that you’re not dreaming now? Mightn’t it be that...?’, and 
conclud[ing] that the experimenter’s records were erroneous.” The absurdity of 
Descartes’s skeptical challenge indicates that the experimenter’s claim is plain. 
Thus, her “records are not to be assessed in this way: Descartes’s querying is out 
of place, a changing of the subject” (LS, 765). 
But just as the experimenter’s claims are immune from Cartesian skepticism, 
so Cartesian skepticism is left unanswered by those claims. To make sense of the 
relation between the two sorts of inquiries, I want to introduce a distinction 
between two varieties of the appearance–reality distinction: the plain and the 
philosophical. A claim to be awake (or not to be dreaming) is a claim to be in 
perceptual or experiential contact with reality, the Real (cf. 766, 768). In everyday 
life, we regularly distinguish between what is real and what merely appears to be 
real. A tower appears round from a distance, but it is really square; etc. This 
appearance–reality distinction is internal to the plain: any question about ‘reality’ 
brought up in such a spirit can be “settled by going and looking” (758), as in Clarke’s 
example of “an immaterial being born and bred in a non-material portion of the 
universe” who asks “Are there really trees?” or, in general terms, “Are there 
material objects?” (758).27 In the case of dreams, we correctly distinguish between 
waking-experience and dreaming-experience in everyday life all the time. It isn’t 
always clear how (or on what basis) we do so, and we sometimes confuse the two, 
especially when we’re asleep; but that we do successfully draw this distinction is, as 
Clarke might put it, a salient fact. 
To arrive at the philosophical appearance–reality distinction, we expand the 
range of the apparent so that the everyday empirical world in its entirety falls on the 
side of appearances: even the ‘real’ established by “going and looking” falls into the 
category of appearance. Of course, philosophy might subsequently establish that, 
in such-and-such cases, appearances accord with reality or even that the distinction 
itself collapses; but qua appearance, the entire everyday empirical world is initially 
treated with suspicion. Questions about reality set within the frame of the 
philosophical appearance–reality distinction ask not “What is really the case 
according to our best everyday empirical inquiries?”, but rather “What is really the 
case independently of what appears?” In Hegelian terms, such questions ask not what 
is really the case for us (what Kant refers to as catʹ anthrôpon), but rather what is 
really the case in itself (what Kant refers to as catʹ alêthian).28 
Historically, the most influential articulation of what I’m calling the 
philosophical appearance–reality distinction is no doubt the one found at the end of 
Book VI of Plato’s Republic, where he describes the Divided Line.29 An important 
and potentially confusing feature of the Divided Line—and by extension of the 
philosophical appearance–reality distinction as I understand it—is that it does not 
posit real/unreal as a simple binary. As Michael Frede puts it,  
 
Plato... ascribes a precarious intermediate status to the objects of belief or 
doxa in the Republic; they come between what really is, the objects of 
reason and knowledge, and what does not exist at all. He does not say that 
what we ordinarily call ‘reality’ is nothing but appearance, that our 
            
27 Of course, it’s an open question just what “going” and “looking” would amount to for 
immaterial beings. 
28 Catʹ anthrōpon means ‘according to the human,’ and catʹ alēthian means ‘according to the truth.’ 
Kant discusses this distinction at Kant 1998, 643–4 (Critique of Pure Reason, A739–40/B767–8) 
and Kant 2000, 327 (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:462–3). 
29 See The Republic, 509d–511e. 
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ordinary beliefs and impressions are no better than hallucinations. 
Though they fail to capture true being and, thus, are not really true, this 
does not mean that they are simply false. (Frede 1987, 190) 
  
For the Plato of The Republic, the Heraclitan flux of the sensible or perceptual realm 
(the realm of appearances) is not simply unreal in the sense of lacking any kind of 
objective reality. Nor is it any sort of ‘inner’ (Cartesian) realm of impressions, 
representations, or what-have-you. Yet it is not what is really real. What is really 
real transcends and underlies appearances.30 
Let’s apply the distinction between the plain and the philosophical appearance–
reality distinction to the example of the experimenter with soporifics. The experi-
menter (let’s call her ‘Ex’) can legitimately and successfully distinguish between 
plain waking and plain dreaming, but both of these states are located within the 
realm of appearances understood philosophically. (Ex hypothesi, even brains-in-vats 
would distinguish between dream-experiences and waking-experiences.) Thus, 
Descartes’s metaphysical challenges will not invalidate the experimenter’s plain 
claims qua plain any more than the absolutely objective fact that aircraft X is a type 
Z can invalidate the epistemically responsible claim of an airplane-spotter in the 
midst of the wartime practice that aircraft X is a type A. Even so, on the traditional 
view, Descartes’s metaphysical challenges can show that Ex’s plain knowledge that 
she is now awake is knowing in a manner of speaking only, for on the traditional 
view Ex’s plain use of the concept ‘dream’ is a restricted application of the original, 
pure concept ‘dream,’ and the ‘reality’ to which her waking-experiences are by 
definition attached is a restricted application of the original, pure concept of the 
Real. The plain concept ‘real’ is relative and presuppositional. The pure, original 
concept ‘real’ is neither of these things: to know philosophically that we are ‘awake’ 
(in the pure sense of the word) is to know philosophically that we are in touch with 
absolutely objective reality, i.e., the really real. In this sense, it would seem that 
‘dream’ might be used in such a way that it applies to all of our experience, both what 
we take to be dreaming and what we take to be waking experience.31 
At this point, I suspect that some readers will have the feeling that something 
has gone wrong, that our thinking has led us astray somehow. If so, then that is all 
to the good, for Clarke thinks that we should find the pure conception of ‘dream’ 
puzzling. 
 
4.2 The Skeptic’s Investigation 
 
Let’s turn, at last, to Clarke’s account of the skeptic’s examination of CSph. The 
examination is framed as an exchange between a skeptic and a commonsense 
            
30 Importantly, the philosophical appearance–reality distinction does not in itself incorporate (or, 
it seems to me, inexorably lead to) Platonism or to any definite views or conclusions regarding 
what we might call the unreal, the real, and the really real. It allows, as we’ve seen, that 
philosophy might discover that the distinction itself is specious. Quoting Frede again: “For all 
[the skeptic] knows, it might be a mistake to distinguish quite generally and globally between 
how things appear and how they really are” (Frede 1987, 221). The philosophical appearance–
reality distinction merely provides the initial frame for any properly ‘philosophical’ inquiry into 
reality. 
31 Interestingly, this is a common way in which the skeptical import of dreams was understood 
prior to Descartes’s ‘subjectification’ of the problem. See, e.g., al-Ghazālī 2005, 62–3 and 
Montaigne 1958, 451. 
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dogmatist. There are two rounds to the exchange. In both rounds, the dogmatist’s 
conclusion is the same and takes the form of a general CSph proposition. What 
differs is the nature of the skeptic’s rejoinder to the dogmatist’s avowal of CSph. 
The exchange begins with the following question: 
 
(Qph) “Can we ever know we’re awake, not dreaming?” (767) 
 
This question is meant to be understood philosophically. Thus, the type of knowing 
referred to is philosophical, not plain, knowing. Faced with this philosophical 
question, the dogmatist responds with an expression of CSph. 
 
(CSph) “[W]e can know [philosophically] we’re awake, not dreaming.” (765) 
 
Clarke doesn’t specify the dogmatist’s reasons for thinking this is true. The 
dogmatist might propose any number of reasons. Here’s one: “I know right now that 
I’m not dreaming.” If it’s true that the dogmatist knows (philosophically) right now 
that he’s awake (in the pure sense), not dreaming (in the pure sense), then it’s also 
true that he knows that the CSph proposition is true. 
But this knowing must be philosophical, and the concepts deployed must be 
pure. Clarke thinks, however, that the dogmatist is appealing to plain knowing 
using plain concepts. Specifically, the proposition that he knows right now that he’s 
awake, not dreaming, is, in terms of its logical type, identical to that same 
proposition made by the experimenter with soporifics. This is, for Clarke, the fatal 
flaw in the dogmatist’s reasoning, for (as Clarke has tried to convince us) we cannot 
answer the philosophical question “Can we ever know we’re not dreaming?” by 
appeal to such plain knowledge. 
In the first round of the exchange, the skeptic responds to the dogmatist’s 
avowal of CSph by pointing out the following: 
 
(Pe) “All this now might turn out to be a dream.” (764) 
 
Clarke calls this the skeptic’s epistemic possibility. Pe is ‘epistemic’ because 
knowability—specifically, the ability to know that we’re awake, not dreaming—is 
built into the scenario itself: the phrase “might turn out to be a dream” implies 
knowability. This becomes clear when the scenario is laid out in more detail: “I 
might wake up later in different surroundings, remembering what had really 
happened in the past, and discover I had just been dreaming” (764). 
Even if we leave aside the plain–philosophical distinction, there is a 
fundamental flaw in Pe, and the skeptic sees it right away. If it is true that “we might 
wake up later... and discover that we had been sleeping,” then it is true that we can 
know we’re awake, not dreaming. Thus, the skeptic’s own scenario affirms CS. In 
other words, Pe contradicts the skeptic’s own conclusion. If Pe has any force against 
our current claim to know that we’re awake, then it will have the same amount of 
force against any future claim we might make to know that we’re awake. In the 
second round of the exchange, then, the skeptic tries to reframe his scenario in such 
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a way that knowability drops out of it. Instead of saying that “all this now might 
turn out to be a dream,” he says only: 
 
(Pne) “It might be that we’re now asleep, dreaming.” (766) 
 
This is a nonepistemic possibility in the specific sense that it does not have 
knowability built into it. Despite this, Clarke thinks that Pne has a “covert but 
unavoidable” knowability requirement.32 Why does he think so? 
The answer lies in what is missing from Pne: a full-fledged scenario. Unlike Pe, 
Pne has no context, no story; there is no scenario outlined to explain how or in what 
sense it might be true. What we need to know is the skeptic’s reasons for thinking 
that “it might be that we’re now asleep, dreaming.” The skeptic is compelled by his 
own lights to provide such a reason, for even if he’s right that “it might be that we’re 
now asleep, dreaming,” it does not follow that “we cannot know that we’re not 
dreaming.” Even if he’s right, it still might be the case that, though we’re now asleep 
and dreaming, we might wake up later in different surroundings and discover that 
we had been asleep. In other words, the scenario imagined to explain Pe might still 
apply. Thus, there is a gap in the skeptic’s argument in the second round of the 
exchange. In order to avoid falling right back into the problems faced by Pe, the 
skeptic needs to forestall the very possibility that we could ever know whether or 
not we are ever awake or dreaming. He needs a scenario that not only takes the 
place of Pe; he needs a scenario that renders Pe false, one that entails that it cannot 
be the case that we might wake up later and discover (that is, come to know) that 
we had been dreaming. 
At first, this seems to present no problem, for of course the skeptic has such 
scenarios ready to hand. Clarke considers two: the evil demon, borrowed from 
Descartes, and the “futuristic physiologist”—a brains-in-vats type of scenario (766–
7). But even these scenarios, Clarke thinks, require knowability if they are to be 
conceivable. 
With this, we arrive at what may be the most crucial piece of Clarke’s 
argument in LS: the impossibility of developing a skeptical scenario to support Pne 
that does not incorporate knowability. Unfortunately, it is also the part of the paper 
most likely to be rejected as obviously false. 
 
4.3 The Knowability Requirement 
 
Let me quote the relevant passage in full. 
 
Could a leaner possibility Px that lacked this epistemic condition be 
genuine, outside knowability irrelevant? We have no satisfactory 
techniques for handling a question like this objectively: we are forced 
winetasters of the conceivable. Acknowledging this, I feel confident, 
nevertheless, that it is inconceivable that I could now be asleep, dreaming, 
            
32 Though Clarke does use the term “knowability” (766), he does not use the term ‘knowability 
requirement,’ preferring instead the more opaque term “epistemic requirement” (767–8) or 
“epistemic condition” (766). The term ‘knowability requirement’ comes from Stroud (see 
Stroud 2000, 34), and it has become standard in the secondary literature on Clarke. 
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if no outsider could know my real environs because in the same boat, for 
the same reason, because he, too, could not know he was not asleep, 
dreaming. Does Descartes’s possibility even seem to make sense, if we ask 
ourselves how the Evil Demon, or God, could know that he, too, wasn’t 
dreaming—and allow that neither could? (766) 
 
There are two questions to ask regarding this passage. First, is it true that the evil 
demon and the brains-in-vats scenarios incorporate knowability? Second, is it 
possible to develop a new scenario that supports Pne but does not incorporate 
knowability? 
Regarding the first question, a common and understandable response is, “No, 
of course not!” Stroud, for instance, writes, 
 
Must we suppose that the evil demon, or some being lurking somewhere 
in the wings, knows, or even could know, what is really going on? Again, 
it seems to me the answer is ‘No’. And that is because, when the question 
arises of how or whether the demon or the physiologist does know what’s 
really going on, I think I can concede that he does not, or even could not 
know, without in any way threatening the intelligibility of the possibility 
I am trying to conceive of. If I could be in such a situation then I don’t 
know now that I’m not being fooled by a demon or a physiologist, and if 
they could be in a similar situation (as they could) then they don’t know 
either. So we are all in the same boat. (Stroud 2000, 35–6) 
 
It seems to me that this response betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what 
Clarke is saying. Stroud’s mistake is to think that the knowability in question is 
philosophical, despite that it is plain knowability that Clarke is talking about: “Pne, as 
I conceive it, is, of course, plain: the knowability by outsiders of what’s real is quite 
obviously so” (766; emphasis added). He reiterates the point a couple pages later: “... 
it is integral to Dream’s being a concept that its antithesis, the real or portions of 
the real, be knowable (plain) as real” (768). In reading LS, we need constantly to 
bear in mind the plain–philosophical distinction. Just as there is plain as well as 
philosophical common sense, and just as there is plain as well as philosophical 
knowing, so there are plain as well as philosophical versions of the concepts ‘dream,’ 
‘awake,’ and ‘real.’ It seems to me that Stroud reads Clarke as if he were saying this: 
“I feel confident... that it is inconceivable that I could now be asleepph, dreamingph, 
if no outsider could knowph my real environs because in the same boat, for the same 
reason, because he, too, could not knowph he was not asleepph, dreamingph.” If I’m 
right, however, then all of those PH subscripts must be replaced by PL subscripts if 
we’re not to misrepresent Clarke. 
As I read him, Clarke is not saying that the evil demon or the futuristic 
physiologist is in possession of philosophical knowledge about the Real understood 
as the absolutely objective state of the world. What the knowability requirement 
requires is only the possibility—the conceivability—of the demon or the 
physiologist having plain knowledge of our “real” surroundings, where “real” is 
itself understood plainly. In the case of the futuristic physiologist, that would entail 
that the physiologist has plain knowledge that we are brains-in-vats in his lab. 
Notice how this contention ties back to the immunity thesis. Given that such plain 
empirical knowledge-claims are immune from “outside undermining,” they can be 
known on the basis of everyday criteria such as seeing or measuring. The futuristic 
physiologist knows (plainly) that we are brains-in-vats. What Clarke is saying is 
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that we can conceive of this scenario only because we can conceive of being in the 
physiologist’s position and knowing (plainly) what the physiologist plainly knows. 
Now let’s address the second question: can we invent any new scenario in 
support of Pne that does not incorporate knowability? The reason Clarke thinks we 
cannot is because he thinks that our concepts as we use them in everyday life are 
fundamentally plain, not philosophical. Here, he is rejecting the first aspect of the 
SCHC: that our concepts are first and foremost context-free (until and unless we 
‘implain’ them). Clarke wants to convince us that the traditional view gets things 
backward. Our concepts, such as ‘dream’ and ‘awake,’ are fundamentally plain. In 
imagining skeptical scenarios, we take our plain concepts, which have full-bodied 
meaning only in everyday contexts, and try to understand them purely. In doing 
so, we project our plain concepts outward. I am borrowing the idea of ‘concept-
projection’ from Cavell, but what I mean by it is present in LS: to project plain 
concepts outside of the (= our) plain is to “[draw] on ordinary, everyday 
possibilities and [judge] that they could have unusual application” (766). Contra 
ordinary-language philosophers, Clarke thinks that we can successfully pull our 
plain concepts ‘dream,’ ‘awake,’ and ‘real’ out of our plain. We do not thereby seize 
hold of those concepts in their original, context-free form, however. Rather, we 
discover that context-free concepts are hopelessly indeterminate: they are 
incomplete, skeletal. But we also discover that we can fill in their meaning: we can 
find that our plain concepts are capable of playing an “unusual” role in some alien 
context. In short, we discover that “outside the circle of the plain does not lie what 
we wished and presumed” (769): we do not discover the philosophical, but only 
other possible, more metaphysically encompassing plains. 
For instance, if we’re brains-in-vats, then our everyday distinction between 
‘waking’ and ‘dreaming’ would itself be internal to the vat-experience. When we 
appeal to that scenario to support the possibility that we can never know that we’re 
not dreaming, we’re no longer using ‘dream’ in this (= our) ordinary, everyday 
sense. Instead, ‘dream’ now encompasses all of our experience: what it means when 
used in this way is something like “to be envatted.” In this case, to ‘wake up’ would 
mean to wake up in the vat, or to become aware somehow of the (plainly known) ‘real’ 
surroundings of the physiologist. The only way we can make sense of the brains-
in-vats scenario, though, is by projecting our plain concepts into a new conceivable 
context, namely, the context of the futuristic physiologist. We imagine ourselves 
occupying the everyday context of the physiologist, and we imagine ourselves using 
these concepts in the way the physiologist uses them in that context when talking 
about his brains-in-vats. Clarke thinks that if you were to strip away all plain 
knowability, then we would simply lose our grip on what ‘dream’ and ‘awake’ and 
‘real’ even mean. The very concepts would no longer make complete sense. 
Some have found in Clarke’s insistence on the knowability requirement a 
problematic commitment to verificationism.33 It isn’t easy to assess this charge, 
since it isn’t always clear what it amounts to.34 I am inclined to think that Clarke is 
not committed to any form of verificationism. For one thing, it’s incorrect to say 
            
33 Cf. Williams 1991, 196; Gascoigne 2007, 19. Arata Hamawaki ascribes to Stroud the worry 
that Clarke’s diagnosis of skepticism depends on a commitment to verificationism (Hamawaki 
2014, 211–2). 
34 As Thomas Uebel has recently shown, verificationism comes in many shapes and sizes even 
if we focus only on the versions of it developed by the Vienna Circle. One important 
distinction is between “verification as a theory of meaning of empirical propositions” and 
“verificationism as a criterion of the meaningfulness of empirical propositions” (Uebel 2019, 
2). If Clarke is a verificationist, then it is in the second sense, which is also how Stroud 
understands it (cf. Stroud 1984, 170; Stroud 2000, 80–1, 162). 
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that for him verifiability or knowability is a criterion of meaningfulness full stop, 
for Clarke does not hold that our concepts are meaningless in the absence of a 
procedure for verifying that they apply in some case or other. When stripped from 
the contexts that complete their meaning, our concepts nonetheless retain skeletal 
meaning. Moreover, it seems to me that Clarke’s ‘knowability criterion’ of 
(complete) meaningfulness has a great deal in common with contemporary 
contrastivism.35 Is contrastivism itself a type of verificationism? I don’t know—but 
nor am I convinced that it matters. As I’ve attempted to show, the knowability 
requirement is a direct consequence of Clarke’s two-factor theory of meaning 
together with the immunity thesis. If full-bodied meaning is plain meaning, and if 
plain knowledge-claims are immune from outside undermining—i.e., if plain 
knowledge-claims can take for granted the general CS propositions—then it 
follows that full-bodied empirical knowledge-claims are at least in principle 
knowable. 
Note that none of this precludes any particular state-of-affairs from obtaining. 
We might be brains-in-vats, etc. All of the familiar skeptical scenarios are, for 
Clarke, “plain skeptical possibilities” (764, 767–9); as such, they are perfectly 
intelligible:36 “It seems almost beyond question that what plain Pe and Pne suggest 
could happen, could, indeed, just possibly” (768). What he’s saying, I take it, is that 
there appears to be a gap between our concepts and absolutely objective reality such 
that we can’t make sense of how to talk about absolutely objective reality as it is in 
itself, independent of all possible context-bound perspectives. It seems that we can 
speak only of how it is (or might be) for us or for different yet still conceivable 
nonhuman creatures. But short of enjoying something like the state of epistemic 
grace bestowed upon the airplane-spotters, these creatures will be as unable to talk 
about absolutely objective reality as we are.37 
It is important to see that the rejection of the SCHC does not require us to 
abandon the traditional conception of objectivity, as if some form of metaphysical 
idealism had been established. But it does, I think, leave us in a position in which 
the most reasonable thing to do, at least until and unless the problem of the 
structure of the plain is solved, is to suspend judgment about absolutely objective 
reality and to embrace our apparently inescapable plainness. 
 
4.4 Our Most Fundamental Beliefs 
 
Clarke begins LS by saying that it will explore the following questions: “What is 
the skeptic examining: our most fundamental beliefs, or the product of a large piece 
of philosophizing about empirical knowledge done before he comes on stage? And 
what do his reflections, properly construed, reveal?” (754). 
Unfortunately, he provides only partial answers to these questions. Regarding 
the first question, he tells us that “the real skeptic cross-examines” CSph (759); “the 
skeptic assaults CSph” (767); skepticism is the “denial” of CSph (762). Regarding the 
            
35 According to one of contrastivism’s foremost proponents, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “A 
contrastivist view of a concept holds that all or some claims using that concept are best 
understood with an extra logical space for a contrast class” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2013, 134). 
This fits well with Clarke’s two-factor theory of meaning. 
36 This is another reason to think that Clarke is not committed to verificationism, for 
verificationism was supposed to foreclose the very possibility of meaningfully stating skeptical 
scenarios. 
37 In this connection, see the fascinating article by R. Scott Bakker (Bakker 2017). 
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second question, he tells us that “skeptical doubts... reveal that CSph and its skeptical 
denial should both be erased from the books” (762). But he says nothing more in LS 
about “our most fundamental beliefs.” In NTE, where CS just is CSph, our most 
fundamental beliefs—those “deeply ingrained beliefs about knowledge and the 
world which the plain man unthinkingly holds” (NTE, 62)—are general CSph 
propositions, which are “the product of philosophizing” (NTE, 241). Thus, it would 
seem that, at the time of writing NTE, Clarke’s answer to his first question would 
be: “The skeptic is examining both our most fundamental beliefs and the product of 
a large piece of philosophizing, for our most fundamental beliefs are themselves 
philosophical.” I think it is clear that, by the time he wrote LS, he had revised this 
view. In LS, he does not think that our most fundamental beliefs are general CSph 
propositions, for those have been “erased from the books.” What are our most 
fundamental beliefs, then? 
One obvious possibility is that our most fundamental beliefs are instead 
general CSpl propositions of the sort defended by Moore. This finds support in 
Clarke’s claim that Moore “drags [philosophers] down from our ivory towers, we 
reflective, ethereal beings, back to our earthly selves, and confronts us with the 
plainness of what we do believe as plain men” (758). As discussed above, however, 
it doesn’t seem right to say that plain men believe general CS propositions, whether 
plain or philosophical. What we most commonly believe as plain men are particular 
everyday claims, such as “I know there are two bottles of milk on my neighbor’s 
doorstep,” not general CS propositions such as “I know there are material objects” 
(755). But particular everyday claims also do not seem like good candidates for “our 
most fundamental beliefs.” Presumably, this category is supposed to pick out some 
small, more or less definite sets of beliefs, not an open-ended list of particular 
everyday beliefs. Moore, however, does seem to think that particular everyday 
claims are more fundamental than general CS propositions are: the truth of claims 
such as ‘external objects exist’ follows from the truth of particular everyday claims 
such as ‘here is a hand’ (cf. Moore 1959, 143–6). To arrive at the general CSph 
propositions, we single out a best-case of knowing and resolve to understand it as 
an instance of a general CSph proposition. Given that set-up, general CSph 
propositions are more fundamental than their particular instances. But general CSpl 
propositions are arrived at in a different way. 
To see how the peculiar category of CSpl emerges, we must first look at 
Moore’s attempted refutation of skepticism. On Clarke’s account, that refutation 
proceeds as follows. First, we note that propositions that are typographically 
identical to general CS propositions are made in the course of everyday life. For 
instance, Clarke imagines “a physiologist lecturing on mental abnormalities” 
saying, “Each of us who is normal knows that he is now awake, not dreaming or 
hallucinating... In contrast, individuals suffering from certain mental abnormalities 
each believes that what we know to be the real, public world is his imaginative 
creation” (756). Second, we note that, as plain, such propositions (i.e., the italicized 
portion of the above quote) are immune from outside undermining and are therefore 
legitimate knowledge-claims (756). Third, we note that such propositions, being 
propositions of CS, contradict the skeptical conclusion that we can never know 
we’re awake, not dreaming. Finally, we conclude that such claims prove that 
skepticism is false. But something has gone wrong here, for Moore is attempting 
to refute SKph by appeal to a plain knowledge-claim, a move that Clarke disallows. 
As we’ve seen, the primary difference between plain and philosophical 
utterances is that plain utterances are context-bound whereas philosophical 
utterances are context-free. Thus, Clarke concludes that Moore is not simply citing 
the physiologist’s legitimate (plain) knowledge-claim. Instead, he pulls it out of its 
context. Unlike the physiologist, Moore (perhaps sensing the incompatibility of the 
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plain and the philosophical) attempts to decontextualize his general propositions. 
In one place, Clarke says that Moore’s propositions are “context-free” (755). In 
another place, however, he says that they are “virtually, perhaps entirely, context-
free” (757). It seems to me that Clarke was wise to hedge this claim, for Moore’s 
propositions are not, I think, entirely context-free. Unlike Clarke’s imagined 
‘compiler of human knowledge,’ who includes the physiologist’s claim in his record 
without any reference to the context of the utterance, simply including it as 
something that human beings know, Moore does not register the knowledge-claim 
“purely for its own sake,” but only “primarily for its own sake” (757). I take this to 
mean that Moore does have a purpose for appealing to the physiologist’s claim: that 
purpose is to refute skepticism and idealism. Thus, Moore’s propositions have some 
context, though only the dialectical context of philosophical disputation, which is 
itself (somewhat ironically) an everyday activity. He does not use the proposition 
purely, but neither does he use it in a fixed context like that of the physiologist. 
What all this comes down to, I want to suggest, is that the general CSpl 
propositions emerge as such from the attempt to project them outside of all contexts. 
This attempt fails. Moore, the inveterate plain man, is unable to entirely cut his 
propositions free from contexts, from the plain; yet he has succeeded in cutting them 
free from everyday contexts (such as the physiologist’s). Thus, his propositions, as 
meant by him, mean neither what they mean as spoken by the physiologist nor what 
they purport to mean when spoken by the commonsense dogmatist. The 
significance of Moore’s attempt to decontextualize his plain utterances lies, for 
Clarke, in the hints it provides as to why that attempt was bound to fail. It was 
bound to fail, Clarke thinks, because our concepts are fundamentally plain. The 
attempt to philosophize is the attempt to project our plain concepts out of all 
contexts, but the result is skeletal and indeterminate—not meaningless, but not 
meaningful enough. 
Before moving on, I want to return to the problem of identifying our most 
fundamental beliefs. In the final analysis, I don’t think Clarke provides us with 
enough evidence to solve this exegetical problem. Ultimately, it depends on what 
‘fundamental’ means. On the traditional view, the general CS propositions are 
fundamental because they are epistemic bedrock. On Clarke’s alternative view, the 
general CS propositions (now plain—but not implained) are derived from the 
epistemic bedrock of the plain. In other words, on the traditional view it is context-
free claims that are most meaningful, whereas context-bound claims are less 
meaningful because their meaning is a restricted application of context-free claims. 
On Clarke’s view, it is context-bound claims that are the most meaningful; context-
free claims are incomplete. The general CSpl propositions, falling as they do in a 
peculiar space between contextlessness and everyday context-boundedness, have 
whatever full-bodied meaning they possess only by virtue of their being projections 
of everyday propositions. Thus, everyday context-bound claims serve as the 
epistemic bedrock of the general CSpl propositions, not the other way around. 
Consequently, if CSpl is the logical type of our most fundamental beliefs, it cannot 
be fundamental in the same way that CSph was thought to be fundamental. 
Yet one parallelism between CSpl and CSph remains: namely, both can serve (or 
attempt to serve) as answers to skeptical challenges to particular everyday 
empirical knowledge-claims. True, Moore thinks that he can prove that the 
external world exists by ‘proving’ that he has a hand; but he thinks to refute 
skepticism on the basis of the general CSpl proposition, not on the basis of the 
particular everyday claim. In this sense, it may be that the general CSpl propositions 
are our most fundamental beliefs. 
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4.5 The Legacy of Skepticism 
 
The second question with which Clarke opens LS is “what do [the skeptic’s] 
reflections, properly construed, reveal?” (754). His short answer, as we’ve seen, is 
that “skeptical doubts... reveal that CSph and its skeptical denial should both be 
erased from the books” (762). The reason for this, he argues, is that the question to 
which both CSph and SKph are meant as replies—“Can we ever knowph we’re awakeph, 
not dreamingph?”—“can be answered neither affirmatively nor negatively” (768). In 
§3.4, we saw his arguments to this effect as they are developed in NTE. The 
extremely compact argument in LS (768) is, I think, essentially the same. Lacking 
full-bodied meaning, philosophical utterances are indeterminate. Moreover, if those 
utterances were full-bodied (or if, like the traditional epistemologist discussed in 
NTE, we do what is necessary to render those utterances full-bodied), then the 
skeptical response would be the one correct answer to the question. True, the 
indeterminacy of philosophical utterances defuses skeptical attacks on CSph, but it 
also has the effect of draining CSph of full-bodied meaning. 
The indeterminacy of philosophical utterances demonstrates that the actual 
HES cannot be of the “standard type” (the SCHC), for if it were—particularly, if 
our concepts were inherently context-free—then philosophical utterances would be 
more, not less meaningful than everyday utterances are. A close study of Cartesian 
skepticism brings to light the fallacy in the SCHC on account of the following facts 
that it makes salient: 
 
(1) The plain skeptical possibilities are genuine. 
(2) Our concept ‘dream’ incorporates the knowability requirement. 
 
Clarke’s argument goes something like this. Given (2), if our concept ‘dream’ were 
fundamentally a pure, philosophical concept (one able to be determinately deployed 
in philosophical utterances), then it would have to incorporate philosophical 
knowability: “the epistemic requirement integral to the concept [Dream] would 
have to be satisfied by what is allowable as knowing within this type, viz., a 
knowing requiring invulnerability” (768). Such invulnerable knowing would 
require that we able to discover, within experience, “features” or “marks” that make 
it possible to distinguish between waking and sleeping. But given (1), there are no 
such marks and features: “our concept Dream... is not designed along the line of 
marks-and-features concepts” (768). Thus, our concept Dream cannot be a 
philosophical concept; it is a plain concept. On the assumption that we do possess 
the concept Dream (and countless others that would fall into similar problems if 
applied purely), it follows “that our conceptual-human constitution can’t be of the 
standard type; for, if it were, it would be seriously concept-impoverished” (769). If 
the SCHC were the actual HES, then our concepts would be fundamentally 
philosophical; yet if our concepts were fundamentally philosophical, then we would 
have few if any concepts. We would lack even concepts that we manifestly do 
possess. 
It might be objected that, on my own reading, Clarke’s argument for the 
knowability requirement is an argument for plain knowability. Therefore, it does 
nothing to establish that philosophical concepts incorporate a philosophical 
knowability requirement. But this objection is beside the point. What Clarke is 
trying to establish, or at least to begin establishing by way of the concept Dream, 
is that our concepts as we use them incorporate a knowability requirement. Given 
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that the plain skeptical possibilities are genuine, then our concept Dream can satisfy 
the knowability requirement only if it is plain. 
And here we come to what Clarke thinks is the real problem: how to explain 
the plain’s immunity to outside undermining if one rejects the traditional account. 
The tradition vindicated plain knowing by understanding the HES on the model of 
the SCHC and by restricting the scope of plain knowing within the larger domain 
of the philosophical. Clarke has upended this view of our concepts, yet a powerful 
skeptical threat remains: the threat of plain skepticism. The “outside” from which 
our plain can be undermined is no longer the philosophical; rather, it is the possible 
plains (such as that of the futuristic physiologist) that may metaphysically 
encompass—and thereby structure—our plain. If we are to make sense of the 
genuineness and legitimacy of our plain knowing, then we must develop a new 
account of the plain and the HES that accounts both for our possession of concepts 
such as Dream (i.e., knowable concepts) and the genuineness of the plain skeptical 
possibilities. How is it that we can plainly know anything about the world—indeed, 
what is ‘the world’?—if it remains possible that we are dreaming or brains-in-vats? 
What is the contribution to the meaning of our utterances (or: what is the criterion 
of the relevancy/irrelevancy of counterpossibilities) provided by the non-rule-like 
dimension of the plain if not the restriction of the semantic scope of our utterances? 
Until and unless we can answer these questions, we must admit, Clarke thinks, that 
“we have no conception of empirical knowledge” (NTE, 241), “of how knowing and 
seeing can be genuine even though essentially dependent on” the non-rule-like 
dimension of meaning (NTE, 248). This “philosophical problem of the greatest 
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